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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the landmark decision Loving v. Virginia, the United States 
Supreme Court held that laws prohibiting interracial marriages violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because they 
served the impermissible purpose of maintaining white supremacy.' The 
Commonwealth of Virginia had argued that, because the law equally 
punished whites and blacks, it did not illegitimately single out African 
Americans for discriminatory treatment. 2 In striking down the statute, the 
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Richard Banks, Tonya Brito, Jennifer Chacon, Tucker Culbertson, Rashmi Goel, Kevin 
Johnson, Rachel Moran, Adele Monison, Carla Pratt, and Catherine Smith. I want to 
particularly thank Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Camille Nelson for their dedication and 
commitment to this project. I also want to thank Odeana Neal for her comments on an 
earlier draft, the Wisconsin Law Review editors for putting together a wonderful live 
symposium and for making careful edits and suggestions on my article, and Dean Cynthia 
Fountaine of the Texas Wesleyan University School of Law for financially supporting the 
project. Finally, a special thanks to my wife Katharine Hahn for her encouragement, 
support, and love. 
1. See 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
2. See id. at 7-8. 
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Court rejected the notion that the equal application of miscegenation 
laws made them consistent with equal protection.3 
The Court, however, never adequately addressed an apparent flaw in 
its reasoning. According to conventional understandings of how white 
supremacy operates, laws promoting white supremacy are supposed to 
invidiously discriminate against blacks while benefiting whites. But how 
can miscegenation laws promote white supremacy and the interests of 
whites if the laws actually restrict their fundamental right of association 
and punish them if they cross racial boundaries? Was the Court 
contending that miscegenation laws promoted white supremacy in spite 
of their incidental effects on the individual rights of whites? 
This Article will argue that miscegenation laws functioned to 
promote the supremacy of the white race by, paradoxically, deliberately 
regulating and restricting the liberty of white individuals. Segregationists 
feared that some whites, particularly women and children, wanted to 
relate to blacks as social equals. Without legal restrictions on the 
associational rights of whites, segregationists feared that blacks would 
gain social equality and freely enter into equal intimate relations-and 
ultimately marriages-with them. This would result in more interracial 
families, and inevitably end in the creation of a nation of a "mongrel 
breed of citizens."4 
This Article contends that segregationist justifications for 
miscegenation and segregation laws shows that those laws effectively 
imposed a legal duty on whites to adhere to cultural norms of endogamy. 
Dominant social groups enforce rules of endogamy-the cultural practice 
of encouraging people to marry within their own social group-to protect 
the dominant status of their individual members and of the social group 
in general. Thus, laws prohibiting interracial marriages regulated white 
desire in order to protect the dominant status of whites as a group. The 
Loving Court, therefore, ultimately was correct in declaring that 
miscegenation laws denied blacks equal protection. 
Part II of this Article discusses miscegenation laws and the Loving 
decision. It contends that the Court understood that miscegenation laws 
operated to protect white supremacy, but that it failed to adequately 
explain how such laws did so. Part III argues that the primary rationale 
used to justify these laws was the protection of the purity of the white 
race. Part IV will explain these laws' history and demonstrate that 
segregationists enacted and supported them to ensure that whites 
practiced endogamy. Part V concludes by reexamining the Loving 
decision in light of this Article's analysis. 
3. Id. at 8. 
4. Id. at 7 (quoting Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)). 
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II. LOVING V. VIRGINIA 
In Loving, the Supreme Court had to determine whether laws 
banning interracial marriages violated the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The 
case involved an interracial couple who challenged their conviction 
under Virginia's Racial Integrity Act.6 The Act made it a felony for a 
white person to intermarry with a "colored person"7 and rendered any 
such marriages void.8 While the statute required that a white person 
marry only another white person, it permitted members of nonwhite 
races to freely marry members of other nonwhite races.9 The statute also 
prohibited interracial couples from marrying outside the state and then 
living in Virginia as a married couple. 10 Mildred Jeter, an African 
American woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, had violated the 
statute by getting married in Washington D.C. and then later returning to 
Virginia. 11 
Decided in 1967, Loving was a foregone conclusion. The case was 
decided at the height of the civil-rights movement when the Court was 
poised to put some teeth into Brown v. Board ofEducation 12 and impose 
a duty on segregated school districts to racially integrate their schools. 13 
The Court could have decided the constitutionality of miscegenation 
laws as early as 1955, shortly after it decided Brown. In Nairn v. Nairn, a 
Chinese sailor challenged the constitutionality of Virginia's Racial 
Integrity Act, contending that his marriage had been improperly annulled 
solely on the basis that it was between a white person and a Chinese 
person. 14 The Court, wanting to avoid handing down another potentially 
5. See id. at 2. 
6. See id. at 2-3, 6. 
7. Id. at4 (quoting VA.CODE ANN.§ 20-59 (1960)). 
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-57. 
9. See id. § 20-54. 
10. See id. § 20-58. 
11. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. 
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools 
violated equal protection). 
13. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (holding that 
segregated school districts had an affirmative duty to dismantle racial segregation "root 
and branch"). 
14. See 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955); see also Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled 
Expediency: Eugenics, Nairn v. Nairn, and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HlST. 
119 (1998) (examining the historical context of the decision). 
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controversial decision so soon after Brown, 15 dismissed the case on 
jurisdictional grounds. 16 
By 1967, however, the Court was clearly ready to further alter the 
status quo in the South. 17 Nonetheless, miscegenation laws posed 
difficult doctrinal questions-questions that the Loving Court failed to 
adequately address. With respect to its equal protection analysis, the 
Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment compelled the 
invalidation of laws that banned interracial marriages because such laws 
violated "the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause."18 The 
Court reached its conclusion by first formulating the contours of modern 
equal protection suspect-class analysis. 19 It noted, without much 
explanation, that certain racial classifications, especially those used in 
criminal statutes, are suspect and must be "subjected to the 'most rigid 
scrutiny."'2°For a suspect racial classification to be upheld, it "must be 
shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state 
objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the 
object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate."21 
The Court began its strict scrutiny analysis by identifying Virginia's 
purported interests in prohibiting interracial marriages. The Court 
referred to the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Nairn v. Nairn and 
noted that Virginia's interest was "'to preserve the racial integrity of its 
15. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking 
in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. l, 61 (1979) (citing STEPHEN L. WASBY 
ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER (1977)). 
16. See Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); see also Dorr, supra note 14, at 
120. 
17. See Dorr, supra note 14, at 159 ("The radical restructuring of American 
political and social mores occurring throughout the 1960s created the ideological room­
for-maneuver necessary for a successful constitutional challenge to the Racial Integrity 
Act."). 
18. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. l, 12 (1967). 
19. See id. at 11. 
20. Id. (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). In 
explaining why such racial classifications are suspect, the Court quoted from its opinion 
in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. In that 
case, the Court declared that racial classifications are "odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100. The 
Court, however, failed to explain why or how certain racial classifications are "odious to 
a free people." Moreover, it is important to note that, in Loving, the Court never stated 
that all laws that rely on racial classifications are suspect. Rather, it qualified its statement 
by noting that particular racial classifications in particular contexts are suspect. See 
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. The qualified nature of the Court's suspect-classification analysis 
is important because it is clear that the Court did not mean that all racial classifications, 
whether invidious or benign, are necessarily suspect. Thus, the actual reasoning in Loving 
does not speak to, for example, whether race-conscious affirmative-action programs 
should be subject to same level of scrutiny used to analyze Jim Crow laws. 
21. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
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citizens,' and to prevent the 'corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of 
citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride . . . . ,,m The Court 
concluded that those purposes were "obviously an endorsement of the 
doctrine of White Supremacy"23 and held that "restricting the freedom to 
marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause."24 
The Court also held that miscegenation laws violated substantive 
due process by infringing on the Lovings' fundamental right to marry.25 
It declared that "marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' 
fundamental to our very existence and survival."26 Moreover, denying 
that fundamental right on the basis of race deprived "all of the State's 
citizens of liberty without due process of law."27 The Court concluded 
that "[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a 
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be 
infringed by the State."28 
While the Court's analysis in Loving was cursory and superficial, it 
is difficult to contest its conclusion. The Court's reasoning, however, 
failed to adequately answer several important questions. First, the Court 
did not explain why miscegenation statutes that punished whites as well 
as blacks should be subject to strict scrutiny.29 Virginia argued that 
because the law punished all violators equally, it did not deny blacks the 
equal protection of the laws.30 The Court ultimately rejected the equal­
application argument by declaring that punishing whites and blacks 
equally did not make the law nondiscriminatory.31 It reasoned that such 
laws, because they employ racial classifications, are still suspect.32 This 
answer, however, begs the question: why should a racial classification 
that does not solely target a discrete and insular minority be suspect?33 
The Court cited the Japanese internment decision Korematsu v. United 
22. Id. at 7 (quoting Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 12. 
25. See id. 
26. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 10. 
30. Id.; see also Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (holding that a 
fornication statute imposing greater penalties on an interracial couple than on a same-race 
couple did not violate equal protection because it punished blacks and whites equally). 
31. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8. 
32. See id. at 11. 
33. See United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(arguing that strict judicial scrutiny is appropriate when a law discriminates against a 
discrete and insular minority). 
468 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
States34 to justify its application of strict scrutiny. In Korematsu, 
however, the racial classification was deemed suspect because the 
government singled out a racial minority and deprived only that group of 
their civil liberties.35 This was not the case in Loving. 
Second, the Court also failed to satisfactorily explain how a law that 
restricted whites' fundamental right to marry promoted the supremacy of 
whites. Miscegenation laws restricted the fundamental right of 
association for whites as well as blacks. Moreover, the law arguably was 
even more restrictive of white liberty, given that members of nonwhite 
races were free to marry a person outside of their race as long as that 
person was not white, while whites could only marry within their race.36 
III. THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE PURITY OF THE WHITE RACE: 

SOCIAL EQUALITY THROUGH INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE 

For segregationists, the goal of miscegenation and segregation laws 
was to protect the purity or integrity of the white race. 37 As the 
Mississippi Supreme Court in Rice v. Gong Lum declared, "To all 
persons acquainted with the social conditions of this state and of the 
Southern states generally it is well known that it is the earnest desire of 
the white race to preserve its racial integrity and purity ...." 38 The court 
observed that the Mississippi State Constitution prohibited interracial 
marriages only between whites and racial minorities.39 The court also 
asserted that "[ w ]hen the public school system was being created it was 
34. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of Japanese 
imprisonment during World War II). 
35. See id. at 216. 
36. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
37. See id. at 50 (arguing that "racial segregation is necessary to preserve 
[white1racial integrity"). 
38. Rice v. Gong Lum, 104 So. 105, 108 (Miss. 1925); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 11-12 (asserting that Virginia's miscegenation statute was designed to protect 
white supremacy because it required whites to marry only other whites but freely 
permitted members of different minority races to intermarry one another). Although 
proponents of Jim Crow sometimes talked about the desire to protect the integrity of all 
races through miscegenation and segregation laws, they ultimately were concerned about 
protecting the purity of the white race. See Gong Lum, 104 So. 110 ("Race amalgamation 
has been frowned on by Southern civilization always, and our people have always been 
of the opinion that it was better for all races to preserve their purity. However, the 
segregation laws have been so shaped as to show by their terms that it was the white race 
that was intended to be separated from the other races."); Lisa Lindquist Dorr, Gender, 
Eugenics, and Virginia's Racial Integrity Acts of the 1920s, 11 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 143, 
144 (1999) (noting that Virginia's 1924 miscegenation law purported to protect integrity 
of all races but the statute only defined whites and did not prohibit interracial marriages 
between different racial minority groups). 
39. Gong Lum, 104 So. at 108. 
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intended that the white race should be separate from all other races.',,io 
Accordingly, it concluded that the clear "dominant purpose" of those 
provisions "was to preserve the integrity and purity of the white race."41 
It then held that a Chinese American child could not attend any school 
designated for white children, because her exclusion was necessary to 
protect the purity of white children.42 
In protecting the purity of the white race, segregationists ultimately 
sought to protect the physical and cultural superiority of the white race 
from being degraded through social mixing and breeding with inferior 
races.
43 Segregationists believed that interracial breeding or the 
"corruption of blood" would ultimately lead to the mongrelization of the 
white race.44 Segregationists feared this because they believed it would 
not only mean the destruction of a physically distinctive white racial 
group, but also of the superiority of the white race. For example, even 
though Justice Harlan's Plessy v. Ferguson dissent contented that 
segregation on passenger trains denied blacks their civil equality, he still 
believed that the white race was socially superior: "The white race deems 
itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in 
achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it 
will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage ... 
,,45 
Segregationists were not as optimistic as Justice Harlan; they feared 
that the dominance of the white race would end if the purity of the white 
race could not be protected. Relying on eugenics, segregationists 
believed that the superior genetic traits-and therefore the superior 
culture-of the white race would be degraded through breeding with 
inferior races.46 Once the population transformed into an inferior 
"mongrel breed of citizens," the characteristics of white civilization in 
the United States would slowly disappear. Thus, to ensure the continuing 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 110. 
43. THEODORE BILBO, TAKE YOUR CHOICE: SEPARATION OR MONGRELIZATION 
56-57 (1946) (arguing that whites are superior to blacks and that "the mingling of the 
superior with the inferior will result in lowering of the higher"); see also Lindquist Dorr, 
supra note 38, at 145-46 (contending that many southerners at the turn of the twentieth 
century accepted eugenicist belief that interracial breeding "would result in future 
generations" of whites "dominated by 'inferior' racial characteristics."); Dorr, supra note 
14, at 124 ("American eugenicists generally, and Virginians particularly, argued for the 
scientific defense of civilization through racial purity, using their theories about race 
mixing."). 
44. BILBO, supra note 43, at 56 (arguing that efforts to dismantle segregation in 
the south would "plunge Dixie into hopeless depths of mongrelism."). 
45. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
46. See Lindquist Dorr, supra note 38, at 145-46; Dorr, supra note 14, at 124. 
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dominance of the white race, it was absolutely vital for segregationists to 
protect its purity.47 Segregationists believed that the key to preventing the 
corruption of blood was to deny the black race social equality.48 
Former U.S. Senator Theodore Bilbo contended that the only way to 
protect the purity of the white race was to prevent "the two races from 
meeting on terms of social equality."49 It was only through social 
segregation that the white southern race was able to deny social equality 
to blacks and stop the "southern white man" from becoming "submerged 
in the black mass about him."50 
Bilbo contrasted the white South's success with the failure of whites 
to maintain racial purity in South America. He noted that, after the 
Spaniards had conquered the native peoples of South America, instead of 
"expelling them as the English did in North America, they ruled over 
them and married their women."51 As a result, Bilbo explained, South 
America became mongrelized and suffered from societal degradation. 52 
Bilbo contended that denial of social equality allowed the white 
southerners, unlike the Spaniards, to preserve their racial purity.53 lf 
whites were to grant social equality to blacks, however, the inevitable 
result would be tragic: 
lf we sit with Negroes at our tables, if we attend social 
functions with them as our social equals, if we disregard 
segregation in all other relations, is it then possible that we 
maintain it fixedly in the marriage of the South's Saxon sons 
and daughters? The answer must be "No." By the absolute 
denial of social equality to the Negro, the barriers between the 
races are firm and strong. But if the middle wall of the social 
partition should be broken down, then the mingling of the tides 
47. See BILBO, supra note 43, at 56-57. 
48. See, e.g., id. at 54 ("To preserve her blood, the white South must absolutely 
deny social equality to the Negro ...."); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No 
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms ofStatus-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1111, 1120 (1997) ("[Alfter the Civil War, white Americans of widely varying political 
views reiterated their conviction that emancipating African-Americans entailed granting 
the freedmen some form of legal equality, but assuredly did not require granting them 
'social equality."'); see also Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three 
Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 1689, 1696 (2005) (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment believed that blacks were not "full social equals with whites"). 
49. BILBO, supra note 43, at 54. 
50. See id. 
51. Id. at 52. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. ("Let anyone who doubts the wisdom of racial segregation or fails to 
understand the South's loyalty to the color line make a study of conditions in South 
America."). 
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of life would surely begin. It would be a slow process, but the 
result would be the same. And though the process be gradual, it 
would be none the less irresistible and inevitable. . . . [T]he 
southern white race, the southern Caucasian, would be 
irretrievably doomed.54 
To fully understand white concerns about social equality, it is 
necessary to understand how Americans thought about racial equality in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.55 During that period, 
Americans broke down racial equality into three distinct concepts: civil 
equality, political equality, and social equality.56 Civil equality required 
the acknowledgment of "those rights exercised by economic man, such 
as the capacity to hold property and enter into contracts, and to bring suit 
to defend those rights in the legal system."57 When the framers enacted 
the Fourteenth Amendment, they made civil equality a constitutional 
guarantee.58 
Political equality included "the right to vote, the right to serve on 
juries, and the right to hold political office."59 Essentially, achieving 
political equality meant having the right to participate equally in 
democratic self-governance. While the Fourteenth Amendment was 
understood to protect civil rights, there was some debate as to whether it 
also protected political rights.60 The Reconstruction Congress therefore 
ratified the Fifteenth Amendment to guarantee African Americans the 
"political right of voting."61 
Social equality "concerned whether persons [of different races] were 
considered social equals in civil society."62 Obtaining social equality 
54. Id. at 55. 
55. For discussions about how nineteenth-century Americans conceptualized 
equality, see Siegel, supra note 48, at 1119-28; Balkin, supra note 48, at 1693-1701. 
56. See Siegel, supra note 48, at 1119-20. 
57. Id. at 1120; see also Balkin, supra note 48, at 1694 ("[C]ivil equality meant 
equal rights to make contracts, own, lease, and convey property, sue and be sued, and, 
according to some formulas, the rights of freedom of speech and free exercise of 
religion."). 
58. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 1696 ("[T]he basic assumption of most of the 
framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment was that ... [e]quality before the law 
simply meant civil equality, nothing more."); Siegel, supra note 48, at 1120. There had 
been some dispute about whether "the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery 
vested Congress with the power to define and protect civil rights," so Congress ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that Congress had the constitutional authority to 
protect the civil rights of African Americans. See id. at 1121. 
59. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 1694. 
60. See Siegel, supra note 48, at 1121. 
61. Id. 
62. Balkin, supra note 48, at 1694. 
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meant achieving the same status as whites, primarily through interracial 
associations based on mutual respect and esteem.63 Thus, a black man did 
not achieve social equality if he associated with a white man as his 
servant.64 However, if a white man invited a black man to his home as 
his dinner guest, such an association signified mutual respect, and 
through the association, the black man achieved social equality.65 
Segregationists believed that whites should never relate to blacks as 
social equals.66 They believed treating blacks as if they had the same 
social status as whites was like granting "equality for unequals."67 Thus, 
even a middle-class black person was considered socially unequal to a 
working-class white person, solely because of the black person's 
membership in an inferior racial group. For segregationists, a black 
person's low social standing was defined not by personal attributes or 
accomplishments, but by the collective accomplishments and traits of the 
black race.68 
Even though they believed that it was a universal truth that blacks 
did not deserve social equality, segregationists feared that some white 
persons could and would act to grant "equality for unequals" by relating 
to blacks with respect and affection. Specifically, they feared the 
possibility of whites granting blacks social equality by marrying them.69 
The threat posed by interracial marriages was considered so dangerous 
that segregationists sought to prevent their formation through legal 
prohibition and through the racial segregation of social spaces. 
To understand why, it is necessary to discuss the concept of 
endogamy. 70 Social groups which adhere to norms of endogamy do so to 
63. See id. at 1695 (defining social equality as "the product of natural affinities 
and private social interactions"). 
64. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of 
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1003, 1050 
(1995) (arguing that during Jim Crow, whites associated with blacks when doing so 
preserved the "status hierarchy they desired"). 
65. See Steven A. Bank, Anti-miscegenation Laws and the Dilemma of 
Symmetry: The Understanding of Equality in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 2 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 303, 3 I3 (1995) (noting that white people viewed social equality as 
"private mixing" or the "right to come into my parlor and be my guest"). 
66. See BILBO, supra note 43, at 58 ("The South will not grant to the Negro race 
social equality with the whites."). 
67. ld. at 90. 
68. See id. 
69. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 1694-95 (arguing that whites feared thatl 
interracial marriages would alter hierarchical status relationships between whites and 
blacks). 
70. ROBERT K. MERTON, intermarriage and the Social Structure: Fact and 
Theory, in INTERRACIALISM: BLACK-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 
LITERATURE, AND LAW 473, 475 (Wemor Sollors ed., 2000). 
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varying degrees. Some may prefer but not require that their members 
marry within the group, and there often is some intermarriage.71 Thus, in 
the United States, while socioeconomic classes prefer that their members 
practice endogamy, it is a flexible preference that permits intermarriage 
between socioeconomic classes.72 
However, sociologist Robert Merton contends that in a racial-caste 
society marked by extreme social stratification, "the endogamous norms 
are rigid."73 The dominant racial group in a racial-caste society like the 
Jim Crow South strictly enforces endogamy among its members to 
reinforce its superior position.74 They do so because it is a highly 
effective tool in preserving the racial identity and distinctiveness of its 
members, which helps to maintain the stability and power of the racial 
group. 
Thus, during Jim Crow, because whites justified their superior 
position in the racial hierarchy solely on their whiteness, they strictly 
enforced endogamy. Whiteness has both physical and social components, 
and endogamy helped to preserve both aspects by operating as the 
"genetic mechanism" for preserving the biological identity of its 
members, and as the "institutional mechanism" for regulating 
membership and inculcating white racial consciousness.75 
As a genetic mechanism, endogamy produced and reproduced the 
shared physical attributes that define the white race and its members. 
Thus, through the production of identifiably white children, endogamy 
ensured that the physical attributes of whiteness were passed from one 
generation to the next.76 In contrast, if whites were permitted to marry 
nonwhites, such marriages would destabilize whiteness by producing 
legitimate children who bore the physical marks of "the lower caste," 
thereby blurring the physical distinctions justifying the social 
stratification between the races.77 
As an institutional mechanism, endogamy regulated membership in 
the white race. Across cultures, marriage is a means of social mobility.78 
A person of a lower social class moves up in social standing by marrying 
an upper-class person.79 In the Jim Crow context, in order for blacks to 
71. See id. at 481. 
72. See id. at 482 ("Class endogamy is loosely preferential, not prescriptive."). 
73. Id. at 483. 
74. Id. 
75. See Kingsley Davis, Intermarriage in Caste Societies, 43 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 376, 394 (1941 ). 
76. See Davis, supra note 75, at 394. 
77. See id. 
78. See Merton, supra note 70, at 482. 
79. See Davis, supra note 75, at 377. 
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achieve the same racial social status as whites, they would have to marry 
whites. Enforced endogamy among whites, however, effectively 
prevented blacks from using marriage to achieve social equality by 
gaining membership into the dominant group. 
Interracial marriages were inherently incompatible with the racial­
caste system and, if permitted, they would "undermine the very basis of 
the caste order."80 If interracial marriages were permitted, then nonwhites 
would be granted membership and the white race would no longer be 
white. In essence, interracial marriages would redefine the identity of the 
white racial group, making it impossible to maintain a racial-caste 
system.81 In segregationist terminology, interracial marriages would 
destroy and transform the white race into a mongrel breed of citizens. 
Segregationists therefore understood that interracial marriages had to be 
"strictly forbidden or racial caste abandoned."82 
Endogamy also functioned as an institutional mechanism to instill 
white racial consciousness and group solidarity.83 First, it fostered social 
connections among whites.84 A marriage brings the families of the 
spouses together, and endogamy ensured that the new kinship relations 
created by marriage socially connected two whites families.85 Second, 
endogamy ensured that the children were socialized solely in white 
cultural norms.86 Third, endogamy reinforced white racial consciousness 
by reinforcing social differences between whites and blacks.87 The legal 
and cultural norm of endogamy communicated to whites that they should 
not intermarry because blacks were genetically and culturally inferior to 
whites.88 
In-group marriages ensured that all the powers and privileges that 
whites enjoyed remained exclusively with whites. As Professor Cheryl 
Harris has argued, whiteness was a valuable form of property: "White 
identity conferred tangible and economically valuable benefits and was 
jealously guarded as a valued possession, allowed only to those who met 
80. See id. at 389. 
81. See id. ("To permit intermarriage would be to give the hybrid offspring the 
legal status of its father, and would soon undermine the very basis of the caste order."). 
82. Id. 
83. See Merton, supra note 70, at 483. 
84. See id. 
85. See id. 
86. See Davis, supra note 75, at 378. 
87. See Merton, supra note 70, at 483. 
88. See BILBO, supra note 43, at 198 (arguing that blacks and whites should not 
"amalgamate" or intermarry because blacks are physically, mentally, and morally inferior 
to whites). 
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a strict standard of proof." 89 By being a member of the white race, a 
person obtained rights, privileges, power, material wealth, and status.90 
Thus, during the Jim Crow era, whites had access to superior political 
power, facilities, accommodations, and schools.91 Endogamy ensured 
that blacks could not obtain those privileges indirectly through a white 
spouse or parent. 
The racially ambiguous nature of the children of interracial 
marriages threatened to destabilize Jim Crow-a social system based on 
classifying and physically organizing people on the basis of their race. 
Where would interracial families fit in a social system that created places 
only for whites or blacks? Where would an interracial family sit when 
they dined at a segregated restaurant? Would the husband and wife have 
to sit at different tables? What about the mixed-race children? Would 
there have to be a separate section for them? Would they bave to attend a 
mixed-race school? The entire project of racially segregating social 
spaces would be extremely difficult-if not impossible-if interracial 
marriages became commonplace. 
Given the threat interracial marriages posed to white supremacy, the 
solution seems fairly obvious. Theoretically, for two people to get 
married, both partners must consent. So, even if blacks sought to destroy 
the white race through intermarriage, whites could defeat such a strategy 
by refusing to marry blacks. But if the white race could be preserved by 
simply having individual whites refrain from marrying blacks, why did 
Jim Crow states feel compelled to pass laws prohibiting interracial 
marriages? Because they feared that white individuals would not 
necessarily comply with informal cultural norms of endogamy.92 In other 
words, they feared the power of white desire to destroy whiteness and 
white supremacy. 
89. See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1726 
(1993). 
90. See id. at 1713. 
91. See id. at 1766. 
92. See BILBO, supra note 43, at 55. 
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IV. MISCEGENATION AND SEGREGATION LAWS AND THE LEGAL 

ENFORCEMENT OF WHITE RACIAL ENDOGAMY 

A. The Enforcement of White Endogamy Norms During and After 

Slavery 

Laws enforcing white endogamy have a long history in America.93 
American miscegenation laws of the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century have their roots in laws enforcing interracial sexual relations and 
marriage dating back to the early colonial era in North America.94 
Prior to the Civil War, such laws were enforced primarily against 
white offenders.95 In a study of racial-purity laws in colonial and 
antebellum Virginia, Judge A. Leon Higginbotham and Barbara K. 
Kopytoff concluded that "all of the statutes dealing specifically with 
voluntary interracial sex prescribe[d] punishment for the white partners 
only,"96 and "did not punish blacks at all for marriage or for voluntary 
sexual relations with whites.'m For example, a 1691 Virginia statute 
prohibiting interracial marriages required that the white partner be 
banished but did not mention any punishment for the black partner.98 
Scholars offer several explanations for why early miscegenation 
laws did not punish blacks. During slavery, there were other mechanisms 
to control and regulate the behavior of slaves.99 Moreover, because many 
of the black offenders were slaves, there actually was an economic 
incentive not to punish them too harshly-if the statute required that the 
black partner also be banished from the colony, the slave's master would 
lose the services of the slave. 100 
93. See Davis, supra note 75, at 394 ("[I]n those societies where racial castes 
have arisen there were strong currents against intermarriage from the start"). 
94. See, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 38 (Cal. 1948) (Schenk, J., 
dissenting); RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND 
ROMANCE 17-22 (2001) (discussing interracial relationships during the colonial period); 
generally Judy Scales Trent, Racial Purity Laws in the United States and Nazi Germany: 
The Targeting Process, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 259, 272 (2001). 
95. See Randall Kennedy, The Enforcement of Antimiscegenation Laws, in 
INTERRACIALISM: BLACK-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, LITERATURE, 
AND LAW, supra note 70, at 140, 144-45; A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. 
Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum 
Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1968 (1989). 
96. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 95, at 2000. 
97. Id. at 1968. 
98. See id. at 1995. 
99. See id. at 1994 n.126. 
100. See id. at 2000; see also Jason A. Gillmer, Poor Whites, Benevolent 
Masters, and the Ideologies of Slavery: The Local Trial of a Slave Accused of Rape, 85 
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An understanding of endogamy, however, suggests that early 
miscegenation laws punished only whites because their primary purpose 
was to ensure that whites adhered to norms of endogamy. As Professor 
Randall Kennedy argued, prior to the Civil War, officials punished only 
whites because they "were the ones responsible for protecting the purity 
of their bloodlines." 101 
After the Civil War and the passage of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, the nature and enforcement of miscegenation laws 
changed dramatically, as segregationists took to enforcing miscegenation 
laws much more vigorously. 102 They now punished both the white and 
black partners. 103 Further, Kennedy argues: 
With the traumatic abolition of slavery ... and the even more 
unsettling assertions of civil and political rights by blacks 
during Reconstruction, southern whites suffered a tremendous 
blow to their collective, racial self-esteem. Many compensated 
by insisting relentlessly upon an exacting observance of formal 
and informal rules of racial caste. The result in many places 
appears to have been an enhanced criminal enforcement of 
. . 1 104nuscegenatton aws .... 
The problem for Jim Crow states, however, was that the discourse of 
racial equality not only was influencing blacks to assert their new rights, 
but it was also influencing or had the potential to influence whites to 
accept black demands for full equality. 
N.C. L. REV. 489, 492-93 (2007) (arguing that, during slavery, white male reactions to 
charges that a slave raped a white woman were nuanced and did not always engender 
knee-jerk hostility and aggression towards the accused slave). 
101. Kennedy, supra note 95, at 144-45. 
102. See id.; see also MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN 1-2 (1997) 
("Under the institution of slavery ... white Southerners could respond to sexual liaisons 
between white women and black men with a measure of tolerance; only with black 
freedom did such liaisons begin to provoke a near-inevitable alarm, one that culminated 
in the tremendous white violence of the 1890s and after."). 
103. See Kennedy, supra note 95, at 145. The punishment of blacks, however, 
did not mean that miscegenation statutes stopped functioning to enforce endogamy solely 
among whites. Since miscegenation statutes permitted blacks to marry members of 
nonwhite racial minority groups, the state obviously was not concerned with ensuring 
that blacks married only other blacks. Rather, blacks were being punished for playing 
their part in corrupting the blood of the white race. The state was still seeking to enforce 
the norm of endogamy among whites. Moreover, a significant reason why blacks were 
punished more harshly after the Civil War was because of federal civil rights statutes that 
required racial neutrality in the law. See id. Extralegal punishment such as lynching was 
used to punish black men for transgressing the limits on interracial intimacies. See 
HODES, supra note 102, at 1-2 (discussing the use of lynching). 
104. Id. 
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To prevent whites from being influenced by racial equality norms to 
grant blacks social equality, racial segregation and miscegenation laws 
operated in tandem to systematically enforce white endogamy. 
B. White Racial Endogamy and the Segregation ofPublic Schools 
Racial segregation in public schools was an important means of 
instilling in white children the value of racial endogamy. While 
segregationists thought it was necessary to regulate the desires of all 
whites, they had special concerns about white children. Segregationists 
believed that white children were the key to preserving the white race, 
and that the only way to learn the importance of this goal was to develop 
a sense of racial pride and consciousness. 105 For segregationists, this 
required the strict segregation of white children in all facets of social 
interaction, but especially in public schools. 106 
In an article written shortly after the Supreme Court had decided 
Brown, segregationist Herbert Ravenel Sass defended racial segregation 
in public schools, declaring that "the elementary public school is the 
most critical of those areas of activity where the South must and will at 
all costs maintain separateness of the races."107 This was because 
segregation in public schools was the primary state-sponsored social 
arrangement aimed at preventing the formation of interracial 
marriages. 108 
To understand how racial segregation in public schools operated as 
a miscegenation tool, it is useful to re-examine the 1925 Mississippi 
Supreme Court decision in Rice v. Gong Lum, which explained the 
policies underlying state-enforced racial segregation in public schools. 109 
The Mississippi State Constitution required that public schools segregate 
whites and colored people. 110 The Gong Lum court had to determine 
whether a Chinese American girl born in the United States should be 
required to attend the all-white or the all-black public school. 111 The 
court held that she was "colored" for constitutional and statutory 
105. See Herbert Ravenal Sass, Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood, ATLANTIC, 
Nov. 1956, at 45, 45-46, 48 ("Race preference is one of those instincts which develop 
gradually as the mind develops and which, if taken in hand early enough, can be 
prevented from developing at all."). 
I 06. See id. at 48. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. 
I 09. I 04 So. 105 (Miss. 1925). 
110. Id. at 107 (quoting MISS. CONST. of 1890, § 207). 
11 l. See id. at 106. 
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purposes and, therefore, that if she wanted to attend public school, she 
had to attend the all-black public school. 112 
In reaching its holding, the court relied on Mississippi's 
miscegenation statute, which explicitly prohibited marriage between 
whites and the "Mongolian race." 113 The court then explained the 
underlying purpose of both the segregation and miscegenation statutes 
was "to preserve the integrity and purity of the white race." 114 For the 
court, "maintain[ing] separate schools and other places of association for 
the races" was necessary "to prevent race amalgamation." 115 Moreover, 
"[r]ace amalgamation has been frowned on by Southern civilization 
always, and our people have always been of the opinion that it was better 
for all races to preserve their racial purity." 116 
"Race amalgamation" was code for intimate interracial relations 
between whites and blacks. In other words, the court believed that the 
primary purpose of racial segregation in public schools was to protect 
white racial purity by preventing the formation of interracial intimacies 
and marriages. 117 The logic of racial segregation as an antimiscegenation 
tool can be discerned in the following passage from a speech given by 
Tom P. Brady, a Mississippi Circuit Judge, criticizing the ruling in 
Brown: 
You cannot place little white and negro children in classrooms 
and not have integration. They will sing together, dance 
together, eat together, and play together. They will grow up 
together and the sensitivity of the white children will be dulled. 
Constantly the negro will be endeavoring to usurp every right 
and privilege which will lead to intermarriage. 118 
112. Id. at 110. 
113. See id. at 108. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at l IO. 

ll6. Id. 

117. See id. at 108. 
118. TOM P. BRADY, BLACK MONDAY 65 (1955), quoted in Anders Walker, 
Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral 
Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399, 401 (l 997); see also 
Sass, supra note 105, at 48 (arguing that exposure to other races might encourage racial 
integration). The concern that racially integrated schools could eventually destroy the 
purity of the white race dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, and was not limited to 
the South. In 1860, for example, the California state legislature passed a law which 
prohibited racial minority groups, specifically Chinese children, from attending school 
with white children. See Joyce Kuo, Excluded, Segregated, and Forgotten: A Historical 
View of the Discrimination of Chinese Americans in Public Schools, 5 ASIAN L.J. 18 l, 
190 (l 998). A California newspaper printed an editorial supporting the segregation law, 
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Segregationists worried that white children, who were too young to 
have formed a preference for their own race, would never develop racial 
pride if they went to school with black children and were taught by 
"teachers necessarily committed to the gospel of racial integration. " 119 
Interracial relations would then develop, starting with friendships, which 
would eventually develop into romantic relations as the children grew 
older. 120 Inexorably, these relationships would lead to interracial 
marriages, the production of mixed-race children, and ultimately, the 
normalization of such relationships. 121 Blacks would then achieve social 
equality, the inevitable result of which would be the amalgamation of the 
122 
races. 
White southerners supported racially segregated public schools 
because they firmly believed that "the key to the schoolroom door is the 
key to the bedroom door." 123 Ironically, the importance of schools as 
social spaces for transmitting racial attitudes is reflected in the Brown 
Court's observation that segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to [black childrens'] status in the community that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 124 Unlike the Court, 
white segregationists were concerned about the social effect of 
integration on white children. 
The concerns over miscegenation help to explain the tremendously 
negative reaction to the Court's decision in Brown. Southerners who 
immediately denounced the Brown decision understood that it had 
praising the Jaw's ability to "keep our public schools free from the intrusion of the 
inferior races." Id. (citing The Public Schools and Colored Children, S.F. EVENING 
BULL., Feb. 24, 1858, at 2). It emphasized the antimiscegenation purposes of school 
segregating: 
If we are compelled to have Negroes and Chinamen among us, it is better, of 
course, that they should be educated. But teach them separately from our own 
children. Let us preserve our Caucasian blood pure. We want no mongrel 
race of moral and mental hybrids to people the mountains and valleys of 
California. 
Id. (citing The Public Schools and Colored Children, supra). 
119. See Sass, supra note 105, at 48. 
120. See, e.g., id.; BRADY, supra note 118, at 65. 
121. See Sass, supra note 105, at 48. 
122. See BILBO, supra note 43, at 56-57. 
J 23. Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of Mixed­
Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REY. 255, 268 (2002) (quoting 
CHARLES HERBERT STEMBER, SEXUAL RACISM: THE EMOTIONAL BARRIER TO AN 
INTEGRATED SOCIETY 22 (1976)). 
124. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
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implications beyond the educational context. 125 They protested the 
decision as the "first step in a 'social program for the amalgamation of 
the two races."' 126 One Mississippi newspaper reacting to Brown wrote 
that "White and Negro children in the same schools will lead to 
miscegenation. Miscegenation leads to mixed marriages and mixed 
marriages lead to mongrelization of the human race." 127 Professor Serena 
Mayeri's study of sex segregation as a remedy for racial segregation 
speaks to how strongly white southerners feared the possibilities of 
intimacies developing between white and black schoolchildren. 128 If 
racial integration in public schools was inevitable, white southerners 
were willing to accept racially integrated schools so long as white boys 
went to school with black boys, and white girls went to school with black 
girls. 129 
Once racial segregation is viewed as a tool to enforce white racial 
endogamy, it becomes clear how racial segregation in general operated to 
prevent interracial marriages. Miscegenation laws may prohibit whites 
and blacks from marrying each other, but they cannot prevent the 
formation of the romantic connections that lead to the desire to marry. To 
ensure that whites would not have the opportunity to develop intimate 
relations with blacks, social institutions had to be arranged and organized 
to eliminate social spaces where whites and blacks could relate to each 
other intimately as social equals. 130 Racial segregation in the public 
125. See, e.g., Sass, supra note 105, at 46-47; see also BILBO, supra note 43, at 
55 (arguing that racial segregation was necessary to preserve the racial integrity of the 
white race). 
126. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1482 (2004) 
(quoting BRADY, supra note 118, at 64). 
127. Id. at 1483 (quoting BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A BRIEF HISTORY 
WITH DOCUMENTS 204 (Waldo E. Martin ed., 1998)). 
128. See Serena Mayeri, The Strange Career ofJane Crow: Sex Segregation and 
the Transformation of Anti-Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 187 
(2006) (discussing white southerners' adoption of sex segregation in public schools to 
prevent interracial intimacies from developing between white and black children of the 
opposite sex); RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, 
AND ADOPTION 278 n.t (2003) (discussing calls for sex segregated schools as a way to 
avoid having white and black children of different genders attend school together); 
Robert B. Barnett, Comment, The Constitutionality of Sex Separation in School 
Desegregation Plans, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 296, 297-98 (1970); Moore v. Tangipahoa 
Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. La. 1969). 
129. Mayeri, supra note 128, at 196. 
130. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 1709. Balkin notes that state and local 
governments in the South "inserted themselves into the regulation of almost every facet 
of everyday life, including schools, hospitals, cafeterias, recreational facilities, 
transportation, public accommodations, bathrooms, and water fountains, even funeral 
parlors." Id. Such massive state regulation of the private sphere was done to "maintain 
and signify the superior status of whites over blacks." Id. 
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schools and other spaces was the answer. The segregation of public 
accommodations, 131 transportation, 132 restaurants,133 beaches,134 and 
swimming pools135 can all be viewed as creating racially exclusive social 
spaces as means of enforcing endogamy among whites and reinforcing 
their racial superiority over blacks. 
C. The Regulation ofWhite Women's Desires 
Segregationists feared that white women would not adhere to the 
norm of endogamy, especially given the prevalence of both racial and 
gender equality norms around the turn of the twentieth century. In 
seeking to control white women's desires through segregation and 
miscegenation laws, they simultaneously reinforced norms of white 
supremacy and patriarchy. 136 
The earliest laws regulating interracial sex often sought to deter 
white women from having interracial relationships with black men. 137 
While white southerners were more tolerant of white women's 
relationships with black men during slavery, white male anxiety over 
such relationships increased dramatically several years after the end of 
Reconstruction. 138 
In studying miscegenation law-enforcement patterns in Alabama 
between 1880 and 1900, historian Charles Robinson concluded that 
interracial relationships between white women and black men were 
treated more severely than relationships between white men and black 
women. 139 Records show that, from 1880 to 1900, sixty-one people were 
incarcerated for having entered into interracial marriages 140-thirty-one 
were white, 141 and thirty were black. 142 White women, however, were 
131. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
132. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
133. See Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962). 
134. See Dawson v. Mayor and City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955). 
135. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
136. See Reginald Oh, Interracial Marriage in the Shadows ofJim Crow: Racial 
Segregation as a System of Racial and Gender Subordination, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 
1321 (2006). 
137. See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 95, at 1995. 
138. Cf HODES, supra note 102, at 1-2 ("Scholars agree that the most virulent 
racist ideology about black male sexuality emerged in the decades that followed the Civil 
War, and some historians have recognized that the lynching of black men for the alleged 
rape of white women was comparatively rare in the South under slavery."). 
139. See CHARLES FRANK ROBINSON II, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: SEX AND LOVE IN 
THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 67-68 (2003). 
140. Id. 
141. See id. at 69 tbl.1, 71 tbl.3. 
142. See id. at 70 tbl.2, 72 tbl.4. 
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convicted more often than white men-nineteen white women compared 
to twelve white men. 143 Black men were convicted more often than black 
women-twenty black men compared to ten black women. 144 
In looking at the average length of sentences, Robinson discovered 
that black men received the longest sentences, averaging a prison term of 
3.84 years. 145 Next were white women, with an average sentence of 3.27 
years. 146 White men were sentenced to an average of 3.11 years, 147 while 
black women were sentenced to an average of 2.75 years. 148 Most 
pardons went to white men and black women149-of fifteen pardons, 
while black women and white men each received ten pardons in total, 
black men received four and a white woman received only one. 150 
As Robinson's study suggests, the former slave states found that 
white woman-black man relationships were the most threatening to the 
established racial and gender hierarchies. 151 As a result, southerners used 
both legal and social means to regulate the desires of white women. In 
addition to legal measures, "white women who consorted with black men 
were subject to whipping, maiming, and murder."152 When white women 
voluntarily associated with black men, they were accused of being 
depraved and of having low character and morals. 153 White women were 
called "strumpets" and "unchaste."154 
In the early twentieth century, as women began to win certain civil 
and political rights, concerns over the desires and behavior of white 
women increased, resulting in passage of miscegenation laws aimed at 
restricting the liberties of white women and preventing them from 
entering into intimate relationships with black men. 155 As historian Lisa 
Lindquist Dorr contends, the passage of Virginia's Racial Integrity Act 
of 1924 "reflected fears of changing gender roles and increasing female 
143. See id. at 69 tbl. l, 71 tbl.3. 
144. See id. at 70 tbl.2, 72 tbl.4. 
145. See id. at 68. 
146. See id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. 
151. See HODES, supra note 102, at 147. 
152. Id. at 165. 
153. See id. at 162-63. 
154. See id. at 164. 
155. See Lindquist Dorr, supra note 38, at 144 (arguing that Virginia's 1924 
miscegenation law "represents a modem, rationalized means of simultaneously 
controlling black men and white women" and of "counteracting changes in social and 
gender norms"). 
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sexual agency and independence."156 In other words, during the early 
twentieth century, concerns over miscegenation and the threat to white 
racial purity reflected white male anxiety over the claims of equality 
made by both white women and blacks. Protecting white racial 
patriarchy, therefore, required restricting the liberties of white women so 
they did not violate the norm of endogamy. Thus, as Dorr contends, the 
proponents of the Racial Integrity Act believed that the new 
miscegenation law was necessary because 
women, intoxicated by the exciting adventures of youth, might 
ignore the opinion of their elders, their traditions, and 
ultimately, their racial pride, which, because of the women's 
reproductive capacity, was especially important. Away from 
parental supervision and protection, these women would be 
increasingly vulnerable to the manipulations of new 
"confidence men"-men with unknown racial origins seeking 
to infiltrate the middle-class white world. 157 
John Powell, one of the main advocates of the Racial Integrity Act, 
excoriated white women who engaged in relations with black men, 
describing them as "deplorable examples of [the] breakdown of racial 
pride and decency." 158 Moreover, in vigorously arguing that the 
preservation of white racial purity required the "social control of white 
women," Powell viewed black male partners as the victims of the 
advances and aggressions of white female desire. 159 For Powell, 
therefore, all of society, including both the white race and black men, 
needed protection from the "sexual depravity" of white women. 160 Even 
though the Racial Integrity Act appeared to apply equally to all races and 
genders, its proponents believed that it ultimately was about enforcing 
the norm of white racial endogamy among white women. 
Additionally, it was important to enforce endogamy among white 
women to help prevent mixed-race children from being able to gain 
membership in the white race. 161 While mixed-race children born to 
black women were presumptively identified as black, mixed-race 
children born to white women typically remained with the mother in the 
white community, and therefore could more easily be passed off as 
156. See id. at 150. 
157. Id. at 149. 
158. Id. at 156. 
159. See id. at 159. 
160. Id. 
161. See id. at 157 ("Mixed-race children of white mothers usually remained in 
the white community, thereby increasing the likelihood that they would [pass as whites] 
and marry whites."). 
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white. 162 Thus, to prevent mixed-race children from obtaining the 
benefits of whiteness, under the "Certificates of Racial Composition" 
provision of Virginia's Racial Intergrity Act, new white mothers were 
required to register the race of their child with the state. 163 If a white 
woman was discovered to have given birth to a mixed-race child, the 
state would send her a letter condemning her and her child. 164 Thus, the 
Act, by providing a mechanism to identify mixed-race children born to 
white women, provided a way of enforcing social segregation and 
preventing nonwhite children from freely mixing with white children. 
The mixed-race child was "immediately branded as nonwhite" and thus 
prevented "from benefiting from the privileges of their whiteness."165 
V. BACK TO LOVING 
Understanding that Jim Crow laws regulated white desire has many 
important implications for re-thinking our understanding of the Loving 
decision and Fourteenth Amendment racial doctrine. The Court in Loving 
held that miscegenation laws violated equal protection because the 
states' purpose in enacting such laws was to promote white 
supremacy. 166 In reaching its conclusion, the Court simply glossed over 
the fact that miscegenation laws injured whites as well as blacks by 
preventing a white person from marrying a person of another race. Thus, 
the question raised-but never answered-in Loving was how a law 
162. See id. 
I 63. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50 (1960). 
I 64. Lindquist Dorr reproduced such a letter: 
Dear Madam, 
We have report of the birth of your child, 30 July I 923, signed by Mary 
Gilden, midwife. She says that you are white and that the father of the child is 
white. 
We have a correction to this certificate sent to us from the City Health 
Department at Lynchburg, in which they say that the father of the child is 
negro. 
This is to give you warning that this is a mulatto child and you cannot pass it 
off as white. A new law passed by the last legislature says that if a child has 
one drop of negro blood in it, it cannot be counted as white. You will have to 
do something about this matter and see that the child is not allowed to mix 
with white children, it cannot go to white schools and can never marry a 
white person in Virginia. 
It is an awful thing. 
Lindquist Dorr, supra note 38, at I 53. 
165. Id. 
166. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, I I (1967). 
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could promote white supremacy and the interests of whites if the law 
actually violated the liberties of whites as well. 
Thinking of miscegenation laws as laws enforcing endogamy 
among whites helps to support and deepen the meaning of the Loving 
Court's decision. First, it explains why the Virginia statute only 
prohibited interracial marriages between whites and racial minorities, but 
permitted racial minorities to intermarry with other racial minorities. The 
statute created a legal duty only for whites to practice endogamy. 
Second, the white race enforced endogamy among its members as a 
means of reinforcing its identity as a superior race and of maintaining its 
dominant position in the racial-caste social system. In holding that 
miscegenation statutes were imperrnissibly designed to maintain white 
supremacy, the Loving Court was essentially concluding that a racial 
group cannot use the power of the state to preserve an identity infused 
with racist notions of superiority or to preserve its political, economic, 
and cultural power over other racial groups. 
Ultimately, then, miscegenation and segregation laws reinforced the 
superiority of the white race and the inferiority of the black race. The 
regulation of white desire was a crucial part of the white supremacist 
project of protecting the structures of a racially hierarchical society in 
which whites remained the "master race" and blacks and other racial 
minorities constituted the "slave race."167 
Thus, when the Court declared that Virginia's prohibition on 
interracial marriages between whites and racial minorities violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it could not have been saying that Richard 
Loving was denied equal protection. Clearly, Richard suffered serious 
injury because he was deprived of the liberty to marry the woman he 
loved. 168 But, as a member of the white race, the law was designed to 
promote the superiority of his racial group in a racial-caste society. 
Richard's harm is best understood as an infringement of his fundamental 
right to marry, and not as a denial of equal protection. 
The statute, however, not only violated Mildred's fundamental right 
to marry, it also denied her, as a member of the black community, equal 
protection of the laws because the state was using its power to reinforce 
the inferiority of her racial group. By ensuring that Richard did not 
breach his legal duty to practice endogamy, the miscegenation statute 
preserved the superior status and power of all whites over all blacks. In 
the end, Virginia violated Richard's substantive due process right to 
167. See generally BILBO, supra note 43, at 82-93 (arguing that white superiority 
over blacks was inherent and therefore blacks must continue to be denied social equality 
with whites). 
168. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
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marry in order to deny the entire black community and all of its members 
the equal protection of the laws. 
The Loving Court got it right. The miscegenation law was 
appropriately subject to strict scrutiny because the case ultimately was 
about invidious discrimination against blacks, a suspect class. The Court 
just needed to be more explicit about the way that the legal enforcement 
of white endogamy violated equal protection for blacks. 
In Loving, the Court rejected Justice Harlan's notion that the white 
race is and should continue to view itself as the dominant and superior 
race in the country. Rather, the Court recognized that whites, blacks, and 
other racial groups are all equal with respect to civil, political, and social 
rights. Therefore, any laws enacted to perpetuate the racial superiority of 
one group over another group are fundamentally inconsistent with the 
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. 169 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Realizing that miscegenation laws regulated white desire deepens 
our understand of how systems of racial subordination operate. Too 
much mainstream race discourse accepts simple views of racial 
discrimination that fail to recognize the complex ways in which these 
systems work. We need to first learn how subordination operates in order 
to determine how the law can best dismantle it. To that end, this Article 
has sought to illuminate how segregationists used miscegenation and 
segregation laws to regulate whites and their desires in order to preserve 
a social regime structured to protect the superiority of the white race. 
This analysis raises several questions about the nature of racial 
inequality today, forty years after Loving was decided. We still have a 
racially stratified nation with deep, entrenched inequalities between 
whites and blacks. 170 If interracial marriages were viewed as so 
threatening to white supremacy, then why haven't interracial marriages 
had the effect that segregationists feared that they would have? In 2007, 
the complete mongrelization of the South and of the United States does 
not seem likely to happen anytime soon. Did segregationists and the 
Loving Court overstate the relationship between miscegenation laws and 
169. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 11 (1967); see also Garrett Epps, The 
Antebellum Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 175, 180 (2004) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to prevent 
former white slaveowners from being able to exploit blacks to maintain their political and 
economic power). 
170. See generally John A. Powell, Dreaming of a Self Beyond Whiteness and 
Isolation, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 13 (2005) (arguing that whiteness and racial 
hierarchy continue to exist today despite the invalidation of miscegenation and 
segregation laws). 
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the preservation of whiteness? Are high rates of interracial marriages 
even necessary to achieve true racial equality? Is there any constitutional 
problem if today, various racial groups practice endogamy to some 
extent? We must explore these questions if we are to better understand 
how systems of racial hierarchy operate. Only then will we know how to 
dismantle them. 
